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Urs Stäheli  
Undecidability and the Political1 
 
In order to re-inscribe the political in terms of a politics of deparadoxization, I introduce Laclau’s 
concept of the political. This discussion of the political starts with the question of the role 
dislocation and undecidability occupy (1.) and how the theory of hegemony goes beyond 
deconstruction in theorizing the partial fixation of meaning as political process (2.). This concept of 
the political will be contrasted with Luhmann’s notion of paradoxical undecidabilities (3.1) and the 
paradoxical code of the political system (3.2). Following Zizek’s suggestion of a double inscription 
of the political dimension as political system and as the political, I argue that one can construct the 
political using Luhmann’s systems theory despite its absence in his theory. Such an approach deals 
with the problems of a binary code in a more attractive manner by situating the political in the 
ungraspable act of its inscription and alteration (4.). Yet, it is crucial to acknowledge that the 
contingency opened by the system’s paradox is still restricted by and bound to a structuralist 
understanding of contingency (5.). 
 
1. Undecidability and Policing 
 
Laclau’s political theory is among the few poststructuralist attempts to theorize the political in the 
framework of a broader social theory. Central to this discourse theoretical account is the assumption 
of the primacy of the political.2 The Political designates discursive re-articulations of sedimented 
social practices on a terrain ”where the undecidable nature of the alternatives and their resolution 
through power relations becomes fully visible” (NRT: 35). No ultimate fixation of the social is 
possible, because there is no final ground which could create a closed and stable discursive system. 
Laclau terms the impossibility of closure dislocation, which is marked by three features (NRT: 
41ff.). First, it is an event which cannot be integrated into the spatial order of repetition; it is beyond 
the sedimented practices of a social order. Secondly, the temporality of the event entails the 
possibility of re-articulations and, finally, it is characterized by an absence of a determining cause 
which may be described as freedom. Dislocations refer to the failure of a hegemonic order and show 
themselves in situations of undecidability. The idea of society as ”a unitary and intelligible object 
which grounds its own partial processes” (NRT: 90) is ruled out since it is always overflown by 
discursivity.3 A discursive system, as we have seen in the first chapter, never achieves its full 
systematicity since it cannot represent its own systematicity. 
My discussion of iterability has elucidated that a deconstructive analysis proceeds from the 
impossibility of ideal repetition. For Derrida, iteration designates a fundamental aspect of the 
production of meaning, exposing any repetition to alteration. The need for repetition as well as the 
impossibility of an identitary repetition, give evidence of the always possible diversion of the 
system. Whereas the Luhmannian model of repetition, which claims to account for non-identical 
repetition, relies on the stable form of the distinction and the restriction of iterability by a particular 
medium, Laclau stresses that it is the excess of meaning which dislocates and opens a discursive 
                                                 
1 Denne artikel er tidligere udgivet I en anden version I: Urs Stäheli, 2000: Sinnzusammenbrüche, Eine dekonstruktive 
lektüre von Niklas Luhmanns Systemtheorie, Velbrück Wissenschaft, Göttinge. 
2 cf. Stäheli (1995) for a discussion of Laclau’s concept of the discourse and its implications for social theory. 
3 The assumption of the impossibility of society can also be formulated in a systems theoretical language: ”As reality, 
as auto-referential ‘entity’, as an-sich society is not attainable” (Fuchs, 1992: 25). 
system (HSS: 113). This excess is not restricted to the surplus possibilities of an existing horizon, 
rather it introduces within the system an intertextuality overflowing the stability of the system. The 
very possibility of iterating is always open to a catachretic detour, thus diverting from the ‘normal’ 
path of repetition and introducing an intertextuality which the system cannot absorb. The figure of 
catachresis is a good example of a connotative articulation, transgressing the limits of a particular 
discursive register. 
Since a system is only based on iteration, without transcendental foundation, it cannot but produce 
undecidabilities. Drawing from Derrida, Laclau develops a theory of the decision based on 
undecidability. Undecidability is the pre-condition for any ‘true’ decision, otherwise the decision 
would be a result of the logic inherent in a previously constituted terrain (Laclau, 1996a: 53). In an 
undecidable situation one cannot determine the dividing line between two possibilities, and it is this 
blurred frontier which is located prior to the two poles (E: 68). The undecidable is the tertium non 
datur of a system (D: 220)4 which, however, never constitutes a third term. Thus, undecidability 
cannot be resolved by the dialectical movement of Aufhebung, rather it introduces into the system 
that which a dualism excludes as indigestible abyss. It replaces the logic of neither/nor with a 
”simultaneously either or” (Derrida, 1971: 59). Undecidability, then, is another name for the 
dislocation of a system since it stands for something which the closed system can no longer access. 
The impossibility of completing a system and the paradoxes which arise out of this impossibility 
mark the conceptual field of undecidability.5 
Undecidability ought to be distinguished from mere indeterminacy. Derrida stresses that it is 
necessary to distinguish the concepts since undecidability is foremost a syntactic category ”which 
disposes the ‘entre’” (D: 220). An undecidability then is not given with a particular word, and its 
semantic richness, but rather with its articulation in a plurality of discursive registers. It is in this 
context that one can read Derrida’s distinction between undecidability and indeterminacy: 
 
While referring to what I have said above and elsewhere, I want to recall that undecidability is always 
a determinate oscillation between possibilities (for example, of meaning, but also of acts). These 
possibilities are themselves highly determined in strictly defined situations (for example, discursive  
syntactical or rhetorical  but also political, ethical, etc.). They are pragmatically determined. The 
analyses that I have devoted to undecidability concern just these determinations and these definitions, 
not at all some vague ‘indeterminacy’. I say ‘undecidability’ rather than ‘indeterminacy’ because I am 
interested more in relations of force, in differences of force, in everything that allows, precisely, 
determinations in given situations to be stabilized through a decision of writing ... There would be no 
indecision or double bind were it not between determined (semantic, ethical, political) poles. (LI: 148)  
 
This long quote highlights several points which are important to my argument. It is the distinction 
between undecidability and indeterminacy which is at stake. This distinction has itself been 
problematized because of its own undecidability or indeterminacy (Plotnitsky, 1994: 204ff.). The 
mathematical model of undecidability requires strict determinations of the poles which produce an 
undecidability, yet the full determination of a meaningful unit would require a fully saturated 
context whose possibility Derrida has excluded above and elsewhere.6 
                                                 
4 Derrida (LI: 219) refers explicitly to Gödel: ”An undecidable proposition, as Gödel demonstrated in 1931, is a 
proposition which, given a system of axioms governing a multiplicity, is neither an analytical nor deductive 
consequence of those axioms, nor in contradiction with them, neither true nor false with respect to these axioms. 
Tertium datur, without synthesis.”  
5 For Gasché (1986: 239ff.) who describes the Derridean infrastructures as undecidables, undecidability is the medium 
between a system and its Other. 
6 The quotation itself only acquires a determinate meaning by referring to everything what was said "above and 
elsewhere" (LI: 148; my emphasis) which introduces into the very quote the unsaturability of the context.  
Plotnitsky is right to stress that a strict definition of undecidability collides with other remarks of 
Derrida which highlight the importance of indeterminacy: indeterminacy as the seminal adventure 
of the trace, the indeterminacy of the context, the economy of chance as economy of indeterminacy, 
etc. (Plotnitsky, 1994: 218; 219; 221). Yet, what this confrontation of undecidability and 
indeterminacy misses, is Derrida’s reference to the undetermined above and elsewhere of the quote. 
Even if one restricted the elsewhere to the ”above”, Derrida attacks a notion of indeterminacy which 
equals a full free-play of meaning. It is in this context that undecidability is juxtaposed to 
indeterminacy, yet even here ”a certain play or latitude in its [meaning] determination” (LI: 144) is 
at work. Thus, what Derrida argues against is the idea of ”indeterminacy as such”. It does not 
though follow that meaning is fully determinate. Contrary to a mainstream prejudice against 
deconstruction, Derrida stresses that a relative stabilization of meaning is necessary and possible. 
As we have seen, iteration involves idealization and otherness simultaneously, thus excluding any 
pure ideal meaning. I suggest reading the  above quoted passage not as opposing undecidability and 
indeterminacy, but rather as emphasising that a certain saturation of context, and a certain 
idealization are always required. Only movements of relative stabilization and determination allow 
undecidabilities to emerge. It is here that the formalized language of mathematics demonstrates that 
even the most determinate system produces undecidabilities, thus undermining the economy of 
determinacy.  
The concept of undecidability prevents such a conclusion since it is a relation that affects both 
poles. This is why Derrida stresses that undecidability is not caused by a semantic ambiguity, but 
contingent on the supposition of the blanks of a signifying system. An undecidable relation does not 
simply produce an oscillation between two pre-constituted poles, rather the two values become 
indeterminate through their undecidable relation. In Derrida’s (1994b) reading of Marx, for 
example, the spectre affects both sides of the distinction between body and spirit.7 These intricacies 
prohibit the reduction of undecidability to the missing rule  deciding between two equally possible 
options.  Rather, it is an undecidability within each of the poles which, in turn, contaminates the 
‘clear’ undecidability. It is this ‘re-entry’ of undecidability on each side of the oscillating binarism 
which Derrida stresses when apparently abandoning the concept of indeterminacy: the possibility of 
undecidability requires ”différance or non-identity with one-self” (LI: 149). In this light, 
indeterminacy complements undecidability, given that one does not reduce indeterminacy to 
vagueness or polysemy.8 
The above quote also indicates that undecidables are not phenomena restricted to philosophical 
systems, but can be found in any social system. Moreover, determination itself is due to the field of 
force and it requires institutions of regulation which Derrida broadly calls the ‘police’ (LI: 115).  
An ‘arche-police’ is responsible for a relative stabilization of rules and meanings. The term police 
does not denounce this violence, but points at the artificial and contingent character of any 
stabilization or ordering. We have seen that in systems theory, the media (especially symbolically 
generalised media) exercize such a policing function. Laclau also concedes that the concept of 
undecidability does not imply a happy ‘anything goes’, but ”takes place in a determinate situation”, 
i.e.  there is ”always a relative structuration” (NRT: 43). 
The distinction between indeterminacy and undecidability is crucial for my further argumentation 
since it, firstly, stresses that undecidability itself does not come ‘naturally’, but has to fulfil 
demanding pre-conditions. The production of meaning has to be formalized which results from the 
system’s ‘policing’ work. Secondly, undecidability disrupts the very formalization and stabilization 
                                                 
7 cf. Laclau’s reading: ”The spectre being undecidable between the two extremes of body and spirit, these extremes 
themselves become contaminated by that undecidability” (E: 68). 
8 cf. Plotnitsky (1994: 191ff.) who also suggests a sort of complementarity between undecidability and indeterminacy, 
although he tends to overemphasize this opposition in Derrida’s work. 
of the system since it introduces indeterminacy into the system. This indeterminacy is not a free-
play of meaning, but the disruption and failure of ever achieving full meaning previously discussed 
in terms of laughter (Ch. II), context (Ch. III) and iterability (Ch. V). My notion of a politics of 
deparadoxization proceeds from the insight that paradoxical and aporetic undecidabilities are based 
on the policing and formalizing of a system of signification. 
 
2. The Political Supplement 
 
Deconstruction has proved useful for political theory in showing the dislocations of discourses for 
which it provides a multiplicity of (non-)concepts such as undecidability, hymen, pharmakon, and 
supplement: ”The role of deconstruction is [...] to reactivate the moment of decision which 
underlies any sedimented set of social relations” (E: 78).9 The crucial question that arises and which 
is not answered in deconstruction is how to account for the moment of decision (Critchley, 1992: 
199). Yet, instead of developing an ethical account in order to ground this moment of decision,10 
Laclau’s political theory of decision determines how decisions fix and undermine meaning at the 
same time.11 The political finds its theoretical place where the smooth functioning of discourses is 
interrupted by their failure and where dislocations are (re-)articulated. This concept tries to fill this 
gap in providing a theory of decision which is able to grasp the irrationality of decisions in 
undecidable situations. Such a theory has to fulfil a difficult task: on the one hand, it has to 
acknowledge the radical disrupture which undecidability creates, on the other, it has to account for 
decisions which temporarily stabilize meaning.  
In situations of undecidability only an external decision  a decision which is beyond the logic of a 
discursive system  may overcome undecidability. Hence, a decision is always radically 
heterogeneous to a system: ”The instance of the decision is a madness” (Laclau, 1996a: 53 quoting 
Derrida quoting Kierkegaard). These decisions are contingent because they cannot be rationally 
deduced from the rules of a discursive system. However, they are also constitutive of the discursive 
system, because they institute social relations as a necessary supplement promising an imaginary 
fullness (Laclau, 1993: 283). From this follows the definition of the political as the ”ensemble of 
decisions taken in an undecidable terrain” (Laclau, 1993: 295). Laclaus stresses three dimension of 
a hegemonic theory of decision: The decision ”1) is self-grounded; 2) is exclusionary, as far as it 
involves the repression of alternative decisions; and 3) is internally split, because it is both this 
decision but also a decision” (Laclau, 1996a: 60).  Let me dwell on these three dimensions: 
i) The self-grounded nature of any decision is due to the fact that the decision to be taken is the 
”blind spot in the structure, in which something totally heterogeneous with it -- and, as a result, 
totally inadequate  has, however, to supplement it” (Laclau, 1996a: 55; my emphasis). This blind 
spot is not only the unity of the distinction between actuality and potentiality, as Luhmann would 
have it, but rather something that explodes the unity of this distinction. In this sense, it is another 
name for the notion of excess (cf. Ch. II). The heterogeneity of the blind spot dislocates any horizon 
of meaning by introducing a ‘fourth value’ which is external and incompatible with a specific 
horizon.  
If one takes seriously the self-grounded nature of decision, then the situation of undecidability 
cannot be thought in a horizontal model, as is still implicit in New Reflections. The possibilities 
                                                 
9 cf. Laclau (1996a: 58f.). 
10 cf. Berns (1996) who also emphasises that Laclau misses the ethical aspect of deconstruction by not accounting for a 
deconstructive notion of justice. 
11 cf. Laclau's (1996a: 53; E: 77f.) critique of drawing an ethical injunction from openness to otherness. 
opened up by the dislocation of the structure are here explicitly introduced as possibilities of the 
structure: ”[I]f undecidability lies in the structure as such, then any decision developing one of its 
possibilities will be contingent, that is external to the structure” (NRT: 30). Laclau comes even 
closer to the Luhmannian model of ‘potentialization’ when he writes that agents ”actualize certain 
structural potentialities and reject others” (NRT: 30). However, such a phrasing restricts the 
moment of the new, of the invention and reduces it to the choice between possibilities which are 
produced by the structure. If one defines the decision as ”an act of creation  a reaching out for the 
possible” (Dyrberg, 1995: 14), then the act of in(ter)vention is reduced to the creation of the 
possible. In his comparison of discourse theory and Eastonian systems theory, Dyrberg (1995: 1) 
reads Laclau’s concept of the political as actualization of potentials.12 Yet, by over-emphasising 
politics as actualization one remains within a horizontal model of the political. Even if one stresses 
that the potential does not have an objective existence, since it is ”at once presupposed and posed” 
by the actualization (Dyrberg, 1995: 14), then it remains open how this simultaneous process of 
presupposing and posing works. Moreover, the ‘posed’ potentiality, which is indeed very similar to 
Luhmann’s explanation of the horizon as co-constituted by actualization,13 remains a potentiality 
which does not account for the paradoxical ‘actualization of the impossible’. The immanent 
problems of thinking the constitution of the potential by the actual become evident when the actual 
is conceived as contingent upon the potentialized (Dyrberg, 1995: 15).  
It is true that systems theory and discourse theory become comparable if one reads both in terms of 
potentiality, but at the same time one ‘invisibilizes’ any notion of excess or loss that cannot be re-
invested in a ‘political economy’ of re-actualization. What is excluded with this conceptual 
framework is the radical invention of the impossible, of the unthinkable based on a structure, but 
necessarily transgressing it by creating unheard-of possibilities: ”[M]ais c’est la seule possible: une 
invention doit s’annoncer comme invention de ce qui ne paraissait pas possible, sans quoi elle ne 
fait qu’expliciter un programme de possibles, dans l’économie du même” (Derrida, 1987a: 59). 
These inventions are not located within a field of possibilities to be expected14 since they undermine 
the structures of expectation with that which cannot be accommodated within the realm of the 
possible. Reading Laclau’s concept of the political as a ‘potentialistic’ concept is only one 
possibility (!). But it lends itself to a more deconstructive perspective, if one takes seriously the 
concepts of dislocation, contingency, and the movement of autonomization. 
ii) The second characteristic of hegemony is that political decisions perform an act of radical 
exclusion. This exclusion re-emerges when sedimented articulations are re-activated, making visible 
their contingency. Again, I suggest that one has to distinguish between possibilities which were 
thinkable in the discursive system before the dislocation emerged, and those inventions which are 
created by the opening to a heterogeneity transgressing the sphere of ‘potentialization’. The 
impossibility of invention manifests itself in the necessity that a realized invention will always 
become a possibility since the invention as such cannot be retained.15 If the non-horizontal character 
of the decision is not highlighted, then every discursive practice becomes political, since every 
                                                 
12 Dyrberg (1995: 1) describes the aims of his study in terms of actuality and potentiality: ”The reason for approaching 
Discourse Analysis as a kind of systems theory is that it conceptualizes the political in terms of an ontology of 
potentials and politics as the actualization of these potentials which at the same time structures them”. 
13 cf. III.2 and III.2.1. 
14 Derrida (1987: 33) emphasises that any invention necessarily transgresses existing structures of expectations: ”Au 
moment où elle fait irruption, l’inversion instauratrice devrait déborder, ignorer, transgresser, nier (ou au moins, 
complication supplémentaire, éviter ou dénier) le statut qu’on aurait voulu lui assigner ou lui reconnaître d’avance, 
voire l’espace dans lequel ce statur lui-même prend son sens et sa légitimité, bref tout le milieu de réception qui par 
définition ne devrait jamais être prêt pour accueillir une authentique innovation”. 
15 cf. Judith Butler’s (1993) discussion of exclusion in psychoanalytic terms. 
actualization, as Laclau and Luhmann have impressively shown, implies the exclusion of other 
possibilities. 
How does the exclusion of certain possibilities relate to the concept of antagonism? Laclau 
describes the decision for one possibility against other possibilities as antagonistic. Yet, he does not 
fully distinguish dislocation and antagonism.16 On the most general level, Laclau identifies 
antagonism as the condition of possibility of any system: ”The negation [of antagonism, US] is 
irreducible to any objectivity, which means that it becomes constitutive and therefore indicates the 
impossibility of establishing the social as order” (NRT: 16). The impossibility of social order shows 
itself in the dislocations of a system which are unavoidable because of its differential constitution. 
The problem is whether the fundamental difference between the interiority and exteriority of a 
system is already an antagonistic relation, or whether antagonism is a specific historical 
configuration of a dislocated system. In the latter case, one may well assume that every system is 
potentially dislocated, yet the dislocation is not necessary an antagonism. Decoupling antagonism 
and dislocation, then, helps us to think the antagonistic organisation as a contingent historical result 
which is not pre-given with the differential and paradoxical foundation of any system. Only 
dislocations are an effect of the differential constitution of the system, whereas antagonisms are a 
particular articulation of a dislocation.17 It suffices here to stress this distinction which I will take up 
in my discourse theoretical reading of Luhmann’s concept of conflict (Ch. VIII). 
iii) The dimension of hegemony entails the necessary split between the universal and the particular 
side of a distinction. It is a split which is constitutive for any discursive system since it regulates the 
equivalential and differential relations of a system. Certain signifiers which are emptied acquire the 
function of representing the self-referential play of signification (Ch. I). While every system 
produces undecidability, it is, as I suggest, only an undecidability regarding the filling of the empty 
signifier in an antagonistic situation which defines the political. For Laclau, the undecidabilities 
which arise are not just undecidabilities within the system, but rather undecidabilities of the system. 
The central problem of any discursive system is the construction of its impossible identity. This 
identity becomes precarious when undecidabilities show the contingency of its former hegemonic 
regimen. It is here that the concept of the empty signifier, the marker of the pure self-referentiality 
of the system (cf. Baecker, 1996c), articulates the paradox of a signifier which has to signify and to 
withdraw its significatory function at the same time. Following Zizek’s reading of Lacan’s point de 
capiton, the empty signifier fixes meaning by providing a horizon for possible meanings, but it also 
introduces ”meaninglessness as such” (Zizek, 1993: 177) since it has to undermine the meaningful 
horizon in order to ‘signify’ its limits. 
Yet, it is not necessary to draw from Lacanian psychoanalysis to explain the theoretical position of 
the empty signifier. Derrida suggests a similar paradoxical figure when it comes to the position of 
signifiers which signify the play of signifiers, e.g. ‘pirouette’ marking the line between two 
signifiers (D: 241) or the ‘between’ containing a ”quasi-emptiness” (D: 222).18 The meaning of 
these self-referential signifiers  for they refer to their own condition of (im)possibility  is emptied 
and they assume a quasi-transcendental position in relation to iterability. These signifiers escape the 
differential play of signification since they are located prior to signification as such, prior even to 
the difference between difference and non-difference (D: 209).19 Eventually they occupy the 
                                                 
16 In recent seminar discussions Laclau increasingly emphasises that one has to conceptualize dislocation and 
antagonism independently (cf. Ch. I.5). 
17 Further elaboration on the relation between dislocation and antagonism is discussed in Norval (1997) and Dyrberg 
(1995: 24) who suggests that antagonisms exist ”vis-à-vis systems”. 
18 cf. my discussion of iterability (Ch. V). 
19 Luhmann uses a similar formulation by Nikolas von Cusanus who describes God as prior to the difference between 
difference and non-difference (SA 5: 87). 
paradoxical position of an impossible reference ‘before the law’, which, however, still signifies by 
re-marking the semantic void by any signification (D: 222).  
What is interesting for the discussion of iterability and the medium is that Derrida links his notion 
of the empty signifier to that of the medium. The medium occupies the position of the middle or the 
neither/nor, and it is something ”in the sense of element, ether, matrix, means” (D: 211). The 
medium, whose meaning is undecidable, then is an effect of the blanks between the signifiers and 
shows itself in situations of undecidability. Thus, it cannot be reduced to a repertoire of elements 
and the self-referential imbrication of medium and form as in systems theory, rather it paradoxically 
indicates the ‘in-between-ness’ as a means of signification. It was precisely this aspect which 
Luhmann’s emphasis on the independence of elements had to omit. Here, in contrast, the medium 
constitutes a space for play and reversal, eventually providing a ”floating indetermination” (D: 93; 
Gasché, 1986: 241f.).20 Signifiers such as ‘between’ are for Derrida semantic forms indicating the 
emptiness and the undecidability of the medium. Although deconstruction accounts for the position 
of an empty signifier in a similar way to discourse theory, the former privileges the filling of this 
position, while keeping open the moment of undecidability such as the signifier ‘between’. For the 
purposes of political theory, this restriction becomes problematic since its political application 
would then favour a particular project such as Derrida’s démocratie à venir. What is needed is a 
widening of the range of possible fillings which enables an analysis of hegemonic strategies which 
‘invisibilize’ the undecidability. Laclau’s notion of the empty signifier aims precisely at such a 
political transformation of deconstruction, loosening it from any ethicalizing of undecidability. The 
Political then is the antagonistic articulation that fills an empty signifier in an undecidable terrain, 
and which includes attempts to re-articulate or to substitute an established empty signifier. In order 
to fulfil its totalizing function, the empty signifier has to promise an imaginary order which sutures 
the signifying failures of the system. 
Looking at these three dimensions (contingency, antagonism and systematicity), we see where the 
theory of hegemony supplements deconstruction. Whereas the excess, the heterogeneity, and the 
self-referential movement of signifying the non-significatory condition of possibility for 
signification are perfectly thinkable within deconstruction, it is the competition between different 
signifiers, eventually resulting in the precarious institution of one of them, which deconstruction 
neglects. By contrast, discourse theory suggests that the competition for filling the void created by 
the dislocation results into a movement of ‘autonomization’ (E: 71). The idea of the autonomization 
of possible ‘fillers’ helps us to avoid a restricted, horizontal model of undecidability. I want to 
suggest reading autonomization as the creation of a sphere within the system which creates 
possibilities that were not potentialities of the original system. In this light, autonomization 
designates the differential construction of alternatives answering the undecidability of a particular 
system. 
What is suggested here is thinking undecidability as a two-step process. First, the system produces a 
sort of Gödelian undecidability which it cannot resolve. It is important to see that the creation of 
this undecidability has social preconditions. The system has to be sufficiently formalized, and has to 
succeed in partially fixing its meaning. It is because of this requirements of formalisation that the 
Luhmannian model of functional systems with clearly ‘technisised’ codes is a paradigmatic 
example for a system creating undecidables.21 The undecidability itself has to be articulated. There 
is no automatic, self-creating undecidability which calls for an answer. The second step concerns 
the handling of undecidability which comprises two alternatives: either one refers to possibilities 
which are already thinkable within the horizon of a system. Then, undecidability would only 
                                                 
20 Again, it becomes clear that undecidability and indetermination are not mutually exclusive. 
21 I will take up this argument in Ch. VIII. 
concern the choice between different alternatives already present as potentialities. Or, the 
undecidability disrupts the very horizon of the system and urges the ”irruptive emergence of a new 
‘concept’, a concept that can no longer be, and never could be, included in the previous regime” 
(Derrida, 1981: 42). It is crucial to note the difference with the first form of undecidability. Here, it 
is not just the choice between different options, but it is a radical disruption of the process of 
signification, introducing something which exceeds the system. This opening of the system’s 
horizon, produced by its articulation as undecidability, enables articulations which break with its 
horizon. The excess cannot be reduced to a subject choosing between alternatives, but has to be 
explained by looking at how discourses deal with this irruption. 
 When Laclau says that he wants to consider only those ”inchoate possibilities” whose 
”actualization was once attempted but were cancelled out of existence” (NRT: 31), then it is 
important to understand these possibilities as ‘possibilized’ inventions of the impossible in the 
Derridean sense. To put it in systems theoretical language, autonomization introduces a second-
order-undecidability created by the ‘prior’ undecidability that showed itself as the dislocation of a 
system. Autonomization is already an articulation and initiates a political process since it constitutes 
a field on which the cracks of the system become visible and where they are related to a plurality of 
hegemonic projects which attempt to fill these gaps.22 Proceeding from this autonomization, Laclau 
tries to theorize the taking of a decision, the imposition of a signifier which partially fixes the 
meaning of a discourse.  
This argument enables Laclau to consider partial fixations of meaning in terms of the construction 
of a limit. It is the function of the empty signifier to signify the limit between the system and its 
environment within the system, thus trying to establish a horizon for the articulation of further 
meaning. To be clear, although I have above criticized the horizontal model of meaning, this does 
not imply fully abandoning it. We have to distinguish between the moment which is always also a 
dislocation of the horizon (and not simply its expansion) and the re-articulation of a dislocated 
system. The latter uses the cracks and ruptures of the horizon to establish a new horizon. It is the 
moment of decision and the construction of the limit which deconstruction is unable to theorize.23 
The theory of hegemony tries to show how within a system of differences the filling of the empty 
signifier becomes a fight about the institution of a frontier, which, at the same time, produces a 
‘constitutive outside’ that threatens the systematicity of the system. Laclau’s concept of discourse is 
similar to Luhmann’s notion of system as both are based on a constitutive boundary or frontier (cf. 
Ch. I). Yet, the crucial difference is that for Laclau the dislocation of the system exceeds the 
potentialized interiority of the system and the construction of the environment. Thus it indicates an 
opening of discourse to an exteriority, which goes beyond an observation of the environment (E3). 
The hegemonic act has to transgress the rationality of a system in order to become ”an act of radical 
construction” (NRT: 29). 
The construction of a system’s limit is explained by the theory of articulation. Political practices are 
then articulatory practices which try to partially fix the flow of discursivity which locates them on a 
”primary ontological level” (Laclau, 1990: 184). The notion of articulation, an important tool for 
Cultural Studies (Slack, 1997), describes the generation of meaning as linking discursive elements 
to moments in a discursive system.24 Laclau/Mouffe (HSS: 105) clearly distinguish between 
                                                 
22 I will elaborate this argument when discussing Luhmann’s concept of conflict as parasitic (VIII.4). 
23 Samuel Weber also stresses the problems of deconstruction with thinking the imposition of limits: ”[D]econstruction 
did not, and probably could not address the conditions of imposability, by which a particular system succeeds in 
imposing its particular limits and its authority despite the irreducibly aporetic character of all systematisation” (S. 
Weber in Rüdiger, 1996: 313) 
24 Hall (1996b, 141) also understands articulation as a process of linking which produces a ”unity of two different 
elements” whose linkage ”is not necessary, determined, and absolute for all time”. 
articulated moments and elements: ”The differential positions, insofar as they appear articulated 
within a discourse, we will call moments. By contrast, we will call element any difference that is not 
discursively articulated”. The product of articulatory work, then, is the articulation of moments, 
finally producing a structured discursive system. The signifying work lies in the process of 
articulation which is not just the combination of previously constituted elements, but the retro-
active constitution of these elements. Thus, the model of articulation escapes any simple 
teleological model since none of the articulated elements is the foundation of the other rather the 
effect constitutes the ‘fundament’ itself (Grossberg, 1992: 56).25  
The precondition for thinking articulation is that the linkages between elements is not 
predetermined by the logic of the system; instead articulations work primarily by connotative links 
(Laclau, 1980: 11). This openness shows itself as the undecidability of a dislocation that enables 
contingent articulations. If it is only dislocation which urges new articulations, then we may grasp 
more precisely the distinction between elements and moments. Elements are not simply the 
surrounding environment of a discourse, neither do they constitute a medium in the Luhmannian 
sense. Rather, they are moments which have been loosened by the dislocation of a discourse: ”The 
status of the ‘elements’ is that of floating signifiers, incapable of being wholly articulated to a 
discursive chain” (HSS: 113). Their multiple connectivity, then, depends on the fissures and 
ruptures of a discursive system which no longer fully determines the meaning of these elements. 
Reading the theory of articulation in the light of Laclau’s more recent work on dislocation and 
undecidability helps us to clarify the status of the possibilities which are politically actualized. 
Elements point at the disintegration of a system, at an opening which transgresses the structures of 
expectation. In contrast to moments, elements have lost a place of their own which makes them 
invisible for the calculus of the system. Yet, they still bear the traces of their previous articulations, 
they are still recognizable as element and are not simply pure noise  it is a ”clear noise”, as Barthes 
would say.26 These elements are not independent atoms which can be combined in different ways as 
Luhmann’s concept of the medium suggests, rather they are the necessary left-over and excess of 
the system’s significatory work. It is this heterogeneous waste of the signifying work  the system’s 
vomit (Derrida in Bennington, 1994: 43)  which occupies a peculiar position between the 
articulation as moment in a discourse and utter noise. These elements are not automatically empty 
signifiers, but the systemic ‘resources’ which make possible the re-articulation of a system and the 
‘elementarization’ of articulated moments. Thinking the political as invention in the Derridean 
sense, breaks with any horizon of expectation and draws instead from the abandoned signifying 
material. Here I suggest reading the ”inchoate possibilities” Laclau refers to, literally as possibilities 
”just begun and therefore not fully formed or developed” (Oxford Dictionary). My point is to avoid 
theorizing the process of articulation as linkages within the potentialized medium of a system. 
Instead, the suggested reading of Laclau’s concept of the element highlights its status as in-between 
pure noise and an articulated moment of a system. Certainly, no moment is ever fully articulated. 
Elements, in contrast, neither affirm nor reject expectation, rather they confuse expectations with 
their traces of meaning which cannot be accommodated by the system. The practice of articulation 
is then the very process of signifying failures, of making meaningful the excess of the system’s 
production of meaning. Thus, Laclau describes articulation as the institution of nodal points which 
are ”privileged discursive points” enabling a partial fixation of meaning: ”The practice of 
                                                 
25 This model comes very close to that of a circular causality which is used in cybernetics as well as in some 
deconstructive texts (cf. Johnson, 1993). 
26 cf. Ch. IV.4 where I discuss noise and the rhetoricity of language. 
articulation, therefore, consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning” 
(HSS: 113).27 
Processes of articulation are in systems theory located on the level of semantics, and especially of 
self-descriptions. However, as was suggested above, the discursive institution of nodal points, i.e. of 
empty signifiers, does not leave intact the strict separation between social structure and semantics. 
Since discourse theory thinks social structures as themselves affected by their discursive 
articulation, re-articulations of self-descriptions are highly relevant for the modalities of 
autopoiesis. Thus, re-articulations are here not simply reduced to a correlate of social structures, but 
are viewed as a process which, through a possibly contested articulation of an empty signifier, 
participates in partially fixing meaning in a system. 
 
3. The Latency of the Political in Systems Theory 
 
In contrast to Laclau’s emphasis on the political as a basic notion for social and political theory, 
Luhmann (1990a: 33) considers the primacy of politics as impossible or at least destructive for 
modern societies: ”One cannot functionally differentiate society in such a way as to make politics 
its centre without destroying society.” Every institutionalisation of a centre, not depending on the 
particular system which holds this position, implies high costs and phenomena of de-differentiation. 
Although systems theoreticians sometimes call the loss of a centre the end of the primacy of politics 
(Willke, 1992: 43), one should distinguish carefully the notion of ‘centre’ from that of ‘primacy’. 
Discourse theory shows that a primacy of the political might be retained by a simultaneous critique 
of a centred notion of society. A systems theoretical observation of Laclau’s notion of the political 
fears that thinking the political in an ontological manner is ”consumed by an ever opportunistic and 
predatory moralism” (Rasch, 1997: 103). Rasch claims that the political has to find its own 
autonomous sphere, to avoid the totalitarian idea of an ethical integration of society. 
But what does the primacy of the political mean? For Laclau the Political does not exclude thinking 
politics, in the sense of routines and sedimentations, as a political system, whereas the Political 
designates an antagonistic situation, the reactivation of the radical negativity of undecidable and 
contested situations (NRT: 35). In systems theory, however, the political seems to be reduced to 
politics and becomes a particular version of the environment/system distinction, i.e., one social 
system amongst many other systems. Politics in this sense always remains inside the social; to put it 
in the words of a potential Luhmannian book title: it is the ‘politics of the society’ (and not ‘politics 
and society’). Politics here designates the political system which uses the medium of power to 
deliver ”collectively binding decisions” for other subsystems (Luhmann, 1990a: 73).  
Despite a strict disavowal of the primacy of the political in terms of a functional system, systems 
theory describes phenomena of undecidability and decisions external to the political system. Since it 
is impossible to strictly restrict the defining characteristics of the political system, power and 
decision, a notion of the political is required which can account for those moments when power-
based decisions are taken in different systems (Barben, 1996: 262). Barben is right when he points 
out systems theory’s failure to deliver conceptual tools which would be able to link the dispersed 
moments of undecidability and decisions. Unfortunately, he does not provide any conceptual 
                                                 
27  Laclau also stresses that there is no social practice which is not articulatory since an identical repetition is 
impossible: ”The social is articulation insofar as ‘society’ is impossible” (HSS: 114). Although, Laclau does not 
elaborate on how articulation as institution of a nodal point relates to the articulatory character of any other social 
practice, it is important to note that the necessity of articulation derives from the impossibility of an identitarian 
repetition. 
solutions, and only mentions that the reason for this dis-articulation is Luhmann’s over-emphasis on 
functionally differentiated self-referential systems, and the absence of a theory of collective action. 
Responding to such criticism, the politics of deparadoxization here attempts to outline a parasitic 
concept of politics which is no longer linked to a particular functional system. Thinking the political 
in systems theory, then, presupposes a re-configuration of those moments when the closure of the 
system breaks down. Put bluntly, the political is based upon the dislocation of closure, thus opening 
the system’s closure for re-articulation. It was argued before that autopoietic closure does not mean 
that a system is a self contained identity for it is not an autarchic ‘closedness’ (to use a Luhmannian 
neologism), but an operative closure on the level of its operations. It is precisely the relation 
between openness and closure which will allow us to situate the political. In doing this, I take up the 
question of dislocation in systems theory discussed in the first part of the thesis. 
Nevertheless, Luhmann’s description of the relation between closure and openness is still 
problematic. In my discussion of the system as distinction (Ch. I) it was demonstrated how 
Luhmann internalizes the environment which is the supposed outside of the system. Shifting 
between an ungraspable environment (E1), its construction as negation (E2), and its positive 
signification (E3), Luhmann switches from interiority to exteriority without developing a theoretical 
concept which accounts for the radical otherness of the system. The same problem emerged in the 
distinction between hetero- and self-reference where the self-reference is situated within a more 
primordial self-reference.28 It is in this sense that Luhmann understands the closure of a system as 
the precondition of its openness, thus erecting a hierarchy between closure as the conditional and 
openness as the conditioned (SS: 25). 
Systems theory as a theory of the reproduction of distinctions and boundaries provides a model of 
”limited iterability” in order to restrict an openness not controlled by self-reference. This limitation 
comes from the strict either/or-logic in the attribution of operations to a system: either the system 
constructs something as its own element, or it is blind towards it and makes it non-existent for the 
reality of that system. Only that which can be subsumed under the operative logic of the system, i.e. 
that which is connectable, can become an event of the system. In addition, the operative closure 
requires that one disregards the materiality of operations, since they are supposed not to interfere 
with the operativity of the system.29 It is only in specific systems such as the system of art that the 
materiality of the operations (e.g. the rhetoricity of language) enters the logic of autopoiesis. 
Generally, however, systems are quite successful in doing without the ‘dark materiality’ they rely 
on.30 
Yet, there is also an opening which occurs when the system cannot prevent a self-referential 
encounter with its differential constitution. Let me briefly re-call the discussion of the code’s 
paradox (Ch. I). In functional systems, the immediate self-referential movement of the code is a 
paradoxical (‘the legal is illegal’) or a tautological (‘the legal is legal’) short circuit that needs an 
external reference to be interrupted. To be more precise: the paradox arises only if the self-
referential loop is observed by a second-order observer whose capacity to make sense is blocked by 
paradoxical observations (Luhmann, 1991: 62).31 A paradox is not only self-referential, but also 
                                                 
28 The ultimate foundation of any hetero-reference upon self-reference becomes clear in the following quote: ”[I]ts 
self-reference (1) is based on an ongoing auto-referential (autopoietic) process which refers to itself (2) as 
processing the distinction between itself (3) and its topics. If such a system didn’t have an environment it would 
have to invent it as the horizon of its hetero-referentiality” (Luhmann, 1990e: 4). 
29 There is a ”continuum of materiality that is given with the physically constituted reality” (WG: 30). 
30 Luhmann’s strategy of ‘invisibilizing’ the materiality of meaning was discussed in the section on the medium (Ch. 
IV.1.1). Cf. also in Ch. IV.4 the discussion of rhetoricity in systems theory. Here Luhmann is forced to separate a 
connotative connectivity from the ‘normal’ denotative connectivity. Only the latter is backed up by the medium. 
31 Laclau also stresses that the social does not have a logical structure excluding paradoxes (E: 126). 
causes a situation of undecidability: the question whether the law is legal or illegal is not decidable, 
since neither its legality nor its illegality can be excluded (Esposito, 1991: 47). The paradox of the 
code is not caused by its specific semantic filling, but by the very fact of its being a distinction. If 
one draws a distinction, it is unavoidable to have already distinguished: there is no first distinction 
(WG: 84).32  
The paradox — whether of the code or, more generally, of each distinction  creates a situation of 
endless information which can only be reduced by a contingent decision. Decisions taken on this 
terrain cannot be drawn from a pre-existing rationality or logic. Quoting von Foerster, Luhmann 
states the paradoxical nature of decisions: ”Only those questions that are in principle undecidable, 
we can decide” (Luhmann, 1994: 22; in original English). The paradoxical structure of decisions 
implies a certain irrationality for which a theory of decision has to account for. Undecidabilities 
presuppose a specific temporal structure of decisions: before the decision is taken, there exists a 
situation with a plurality of alternatives, what Luhmann calls ”open contingency” (1994: 23). This 
openness is concentrated in a single decision which also changes the character of contingency. After 
having taken a decision, its contingency points to the possibility that other decisions would have 
been possible. 
It is in these situations that the contingency of the code becomes visible: the code’s only fundament 
is its success, thus finally the ineradicable violence of its institution. The self-encounter of the code 
exposes that which was excluded by its formalization as undecidability. Now, the system oscillates 
between two values which it can neither reconcile nor sublate. The only ‘foundation’ of a system is 
this fundamental paradox which cannot be avoided as long one holds to the idea of an autopoietic 
constitution of systems. There is no external fundament justifying and legitimizing the institution of 
the code. The code is only reproduced by communications which have to refer to the code. It is in 
this sense that the code simulates the ”perfect continence” Spencer Brown alludes to (KG: 302). 
The irrational and ungraspable institution of the code is post-rationalized by means such as 
foundational myths. Only now the code re-enters the horizon of the system, and constitutes it as its 
own foundation. 
The mere existence of a code says nothing about how it should be applied. Only programs can 
define more or less complex procedures and rules for correct usage. Therefore programs (as for 
example, liberal democracy in the political system) regulate the interpretation and application of the 
code, by trying to avoid the paradoxical self-encounter of the code. The task of programs is to divert 
and defer the paradox lurking behind the groundless inscription of the code. In contrast to the code, 
which is only changeable at the cost of the end of autopoiesis, the program can and must be 
transformed by dis-articulations and re-articulations. To a certain extent, the closure/openness 
distinction is doubled in the code/program distinction: the unchangeable code guarantees the closed 
identity of a system, while programs attempt to deparadoxize the code. This requires that programs 
be open to new articulations and it is, theoretically at least, always possible to change them. 
One of the most important ways to avoid the emergence of paradoxes is to defer the final attribution 
to one side of the code (Luhmann, 1987a: 14). Hence, the introduction of time helps solve 
undecidabilities. Deferring to the future solves the problem of an immediate decision: what is right 
now, can be wrong tomorrow. Undecidability does not threaten the two-valued logic, and Luhmann 
argues against the introduction of a third value in the code (RG: 187).33 Instead, programmes 
supplement the code. It is here that subordinate alternative values are created and used, thus 
protecting the binarity of the code itself. Yet, the programmes are not necessarily compatible with 
                                                 
32 cf. Appendix B. 
33 Certainly, Luhmann argues for a multi-valued logic. But this logic does not introduce a third value within the binary 
codes. Instead, it pluralizes two-valued distinctions, thus resulting in a plurality of ontologies. 
each other and may lose their capacity to regulate the application of the code. At the same time, the 
code is dependent on the programs since only the code is unable to create the structuration needed 
for any system, to say nothing of the fixation of the code’s meaning by programmes. Thus, 
programmes cannot provide a grounding for the system’s code that would be prior to the operations 
of the system. What always lurks is the possible failure of the programmes, thus revealing the 
groundless inscription of the code. 
  
4. The Code of the Political System 
 
After having seen that the code creates paradoxes which have to be answered by a contingent 
decision, we can further elaborate this problem by turning to the code of the political system.34  
Drawing implicitly from Carl Schmitt’s enemy/friend distinction, Luhmann suggests the 
government/opposition distinction as the code of politics: 
 
The scheme government/opposition becomes the ‘form’ of the system, the ‘code’ of the political 
system with the meaning that the form has an inside and that the code has a positive, connectable side, 
‘where the action is’, but the inside is what it is only by the existence of another side, where 
alternatives are kept ready. (RG: 421) 
 
In a certain sense Luhmann offers a ‘civilized’ version of Schmitt’s omnipresent antagonistic 
enemy/friend relationship, for political antagonisms are now re-signified within the institutionalized 
framework and procedures of a restricted agonistic handling. 
The code presupposes that every political communication must be referred either to the government 
or the opposition. Luhmann, however, doubles the code of the political system into two codes, 
although this acts against the privileged position of a single binary nature of the code. Operations of 
a system are identified  
 
”with the help of a specific code of its own. In the political system this is the distinction of a particular 
superior power (authority [Amtsmacht]) and its subordinates (ruler/ruled) as well as the coding of 
authority in the scheme of government/opposition. (RG: 436; my emphasis)  
 
Luhmann never provides a thorough explanation of how the ‘as well as’, i.e. a ‘double-coding’ 
could function.35 He explicitly designates the government/governed distinction as the dominant one 
by calling it the ”primary code” (Luhmann, 1989a: 26), but this primacy is put into brackets when 
Luhmann looks at the government/opposition distinction. This distinction is internal to the 
government, which presupposes a narrow notion of opposition, i.e., encompassing only those 
communications that take part in processes of opinion formation and decision making in political 
institutions. Problems arise, for example, with the emergence of   new social movements which do 
not participate in formal political processes such as elections. They are not part of the political 
system and use the form of protest to disturb the political system (Luhmann, 1996c). While the 
government/governed distinction has a wider historical range which may also include new social 
movements, the government/opposition distinction is, following Luhmann, specific to modern 
democracies. The logical primacy of the first distinction is superseded by the institution of one of its 
particular forms which is the model of liberal democracy. Luhmann’s model of democracy, which 
rests upon the government/opposition-distinction, exemplifies a particular hegemonic project, not a 
‘universal’ code of the political system. This coding does not only exclude the afore mentioned new 
social movements, but also has to dismiss a ‘breakdown’ of the distinction as non-democratic. 
There are, however, political systems where the opposition has re-entered the distinction on the 
                                                 
34 I restrict my reading of Luhmann’s political theory to the problem of the code and reduce its complexity and richness 
by focusing on this basic principle. 
35 In his account of the Wissenschaftssystem, Luhmann introduces the idea of side-by codes [Nebencodes] such as 
reputation. Side-by codes also structure the whole medium of a system (here: truth) (WG: 247). Yet, it remains 
unclear how the secondary position of such a code is secured. Luhmann only argues vaguely that a reversal of main 
and side-by code creates problems of legitimation (WG: 251). 
government’s side.36 Yet, it is not my purpose to discuss Luhmann’s model of democracy, rather I 
am interested in how the political system handles its code. 
One of the advantages of this formulation of the concept of governed, government and opposition is 
that Luhmann de-essentializes them by stressing their relational identity.37 Following Luhmann’s 
combination of two codes for the political system the ambiguous character of the government 
comes to the fore, which is placed in the crucial intersection of two distinctions: ”It indicates the 
same and difference depending on what it is distinguished from” (1990a: 173). Therefore, it is 
indeterminate whether the government should be seen as the negation of the governed or of the 
opposition. In most of Luhmann’s work about politics and the political he only uses the 
hierarchically derived code government/opposition without explicitly addressing its embeddedness 
in the broader code of government/governed. Luhmann restricts his attention to the former 
distinction for his main interest lies in the analysis of modern liberal democracies. But the problems 
in determining a particular code and the need to introduce either side-codes or historical 
transformations of the actual code, point not only to some ‘superficial’ semantic problems in 
naming the code, but rather problematise the very status of the code. 
Luhmann’s double coding (government/governed and government/opposition) implies a weakening 
of the binary code. This also affects his program/code distinction because it is unclear whether or 
not the government/opposition distinction is already a specific articulation a re-coding  of the more 
general distinction between government and governed. The complex relation between code and 
programmes makes it difficult to privilege the code for the orientation of the autopoiesis of a 
system. Thus, Ladeur (1992: 137ff.) suggests that operations of every system imply a moment of 
”self-transcendence”, i.e., the reference to a kind of ”common knowledge”. One can grasp this 
collective and emergent dimension, neither originating centrally nor organised, as the system’s self-
description which helps to establish and guarantee the identity of that system. The ”common 
knowledge” cannot be deduced from a central source or actor; it is the effect of different systemic 
communications which is by its very nature unpredictable. Ladeur’s allusion to self-transcendence 
weakens the code’s privileged capacity to generate order, which in turn enables the re-articulation 
of the self-description through hegemonic operations.38 If the process of autopoiesis is not only 
conceived as a point-to-point articulation of temporal communicative events, then processes of mis-
reading of the self-description become important for the functioning of the system. The systemic 
recursivity of a program, reading the results of its own reading, effects a paradoxical intertwining of 
different levels of the system. Luhmann also suggests such a recursive model (cf. Ch. VI.2), but 
restricts it to the level of self-descriptions. In contrast, my deconstruction of the distinction between 
semantics and social structures stresses their impure relation. Radicalizing the idea of a mutual 
entanglement, results in an intertwining that would not leave off the code as a sort of inviolate level 
(Ladeur, 1992: 262). Indeed it endangers its isolated and stable position. 
Still, Luhmann also addresses a possible threat to the stability of the code. If the 
opposition/government code was rejected  by a third logical value (the surroundings of the 
                                                 
36 An example for such an odd re-entry of the opposition is Switzerland where the Social-Democrats, the Conservative 
and the Liberal Parties built a coalition government after the II. World War. In the selfdescription of the Swiss 
political system this blurring of the limit between government and opposition is called Zauberformel (miraculous 
formula). From a Luhmannian perspective, one could describe the situation of the Swiss Social-Democrats as effect 
of the uncontrollable re-entry of the government/opposition distinction, thus resulting to a loss of orientation in the 
calculus. The question which arises for the Social-Democrats then is: are we still the opposition or the government. 
Here again, time is a valuable strategy of deparadoxization which allows the maintenance of both positions. 
37 ”The concept of opposition only has meaning as a factor [moment, u.s.] of the distinction of government and 
opposition.” (Luhmann, 1990a: 168) 
38 cf. my discussion of self-description as identification in Ch. VI. 
distinction) the whole political system would be in danger. This hints at a possible shift from 
institutional politics to the ‘political’, which in turn would question the opposition/government 
distinction itself. It would also challenge democratic procedures since for Luhmann democracy is 
defined precisely by the binary code of government/opposition. Its rejection damages the code by 
dis-articulating the coupling of its two sides. The dissolution of this tight coupling endangers the 
very possibility of democracy because the rules which guarantee the alternation of the government 
and the opposition no longer work (Luhmann, 1989a: 19). The code is thus seen as an inviolate 
level that can only be touched and changed at the cost of destroying the existing political system. 
The code of the political system serves as an attempt to domesticate a more general notion of 
antagonism for democracy. The political system delimits conflicts in providing a disciplining form. 
This leads Rasch to think the friend/enemy distinction on two levels in systems theory: 
 
On the one hand, it should serve to delimit the political system and preserve it from annexation. The 
‘friend’ is the political sphere, the ‘enemy’ all that which seeks to identify the political with the moral 
or any other domain. On the other hand, within the political system thus delimited, the friend/enemy 
distinction defines political oppositions [...] One might say that on the first mentioned level, the 
homogeneity of the political, its autonomy, is preserved, while on the second, the heterogeneity of the 
political, its internal differentiation, is guaranteed. (Rasch, 1997: 109) 
 
Yet, such a suggestion results in many problems. Rasch is driving at a ‘civilised’ concept of 
antagonism, and thus tries to re-enter the friend/enemy distinction, ensuing in a ‘friendly’ version of 
the distinction (which one may also call agonistic, in contrast to antagonistic). The problem is, 
however, equating the exteriority of the political system with the enemy, i.e. here with attempts to 
de-differentiate the system. Ironically, this would lead to the hypothesis of a general antagonistic 
constitution of systems since every system has to defend its boundaries against the overflowing 
complexity of the world. This, of course, is what Rasch wants to avoid: his aim is to conceive of the 
political as political system since it would otherwise threaten the plurality of the social. I want to 
suggest that it is, indeed, a double inscription of the political which is needed. But this does not lead 
to the disappearance of the political. Instead it calls for an approach to the political independent of 
the political system. Rasch suggests thinking the political system not only in terms of an 
antagonistic code, but to conceptualize the whole system’s relation to its excluded antagonistically. 
However, one should be well aware of the dangers which go along with an identification of the 
constitutive exclusion and the system’s antagonistic coding.39 
Before I proceed with my argument, let me summarize the problems identified in Luhmann’s 
account of the political system. Although Luhmann presents a non-essentialist theory of  the 
political, the radical sense of the political as the institution of the social is lost. The possible field of 
political antagonisms is now reduced to the relation between government and opposition. This 
excludes important phenomena such as social movements and other political identities from the 
horizon of the political system. The intertwining of the two distinctions also shows that the non-
ambiguous nature of the code disappears as soon as we lose a single distinction diréctrice.  The 
question arises of how to account for the privileged position of the code and its possible 
transformations. In the case of the political system, the assumed stability of the code creates 
problems which Luhmann tries to repair by introducing further possibilities such as side-codes. The 
instability of the chosen code is indicated in Luhmann’s (1974), now dismissed, suggestion that one 
uses the distinction progressive/conservative as the code for the political system. What is at stake 
are, however, not theoretical mistakes in ‘choosing’ a code; rather it is the unstable position of the 
code itself. The code is hardly an invariable guardian of closure of a system since the reproduction 
                                                 
39 In discourse theory, this leads to a distinction between dislocation and antagonism (cf. Ch. I and Ch. VII). 
of the code has to rely on its iteration which does not leave intact its ‘original’ meaning. By 
contrast, I shall argue that, although the binarity of the code is necessary for highly complex 
functional systems, the privileged position of the code makes it a preferred target for the re-
articulation of a system. Thus, what is needed is an account of the relation between code and the 
programs that regulate its application as a circular process which challenges the stable set-up of 
‘applier’ and ‘applied’. The two problems, the narrow definition of the political system and the 
position of the code, are closely interlinked. The logic of the political system cannot account for 
possible changes and contests regarding the very horizon of the political system. That is why it is 
necessary to introduce a more radical notion of the political which accounts for the processes 
articulating the undecidability of the system such as the code’s self-reference. 
 
5. The Double Inscription of the Political 
 
My contention is that a ‘double inscription’ of the political may overcome Luhmann’s utter 
rejection of the political. This enables me to distinguish between the political system as a place of 
institutionalized politics and the political in the sense of decisions taken in situations of 
undecidability: ”The ‘political dimension’ is thus doubly inscribed: it is a moment of the social 
Whole, one among its subsystems, and the very terrain in which the fate of the Whole is decided” 
(Zizek, 1991: 193). In spite of Zizek’s Hegelian pathos about the ‘social Whole’ and the 
problematic assumption of an all-encompassing decision, it is important for our purposes to notice 
how he links politics and the political. The political system ”represents within society its own 
forgotten foundation, its genesis in a violent, abyssal act [...] politics as sub-system represents the 
Political (subject) for all other subsystems” (Zizek, 1991: 194). As soon as the subsystem is 
stabilized, the function of the metaphoricity of its origin is lost and the system undergoes a process 
of normalisation. By this process it achieves its literal meaning as political subsystem. ‘Literal’ has 
here a double sense: on the one hand, it indicates the ‘invisibilization’ of the political origin of the 
system, on the other, this literalisation is only possible through attempts to control the rhetoricity of 
the system. It is the latter dimension which becomes visible if we look at the double inscription 
from a deconstructive point of view.40 Then, the rhetoricity and materiality of the system point to 
the presence of the political within the system, as it is that which resists the systematization of the 
system.  
This suggests that the Luhmannian political system may best be described as the institution of 
politics at the partial expense of the radical dimension of the political. To put it another way: the 
normal routines of the political system (and of any other system) are attempts to foreclose moments 
of failure and a lack of a foundation, without being able to suppress altogether these subversive 
effects. The political system is only able to function in this normalised way as long as its routinized 
communications work and as long as there is no demand for decisions in undecidable situations. It 
does this by drawing a distinction between system and environment, thus trying to delimit the 
ongoing process of dissemination. As with the empty signifier which fixes meaning, the 
Luhmannian concept of symbolically generalised media and a rigidly fixed code try to normalize 
the deviations, losses and excesses of the dissemination of meaning. 
However, these attempts can only be partially successful since an unavoidable paradox is already 
given with the institution of any system. Concerning the political system the violence of its primary 
foundation cannot be explained and legitimized by the political system itself — this violence can 
                                                 
40 cf. the normalisation of rhetoric (Ch. IV.4). 
only refer to itself41 as that which is beyond the horizon of meaning of the political system.42 It is 
the arche-violence of the impossible origin of the system which violates the unmarked state. To be 
more precise, the ‘origin’ of a system is neither a spatio-temporal event, nor pure fiction. It is rather 
the aporia or the paradox of the system, its non-derivability founding the law (Beardworth, 1996: 
34).43 
The problem of the origin of a system is also the problem of the institution of its code which is 
intrinsically linked to the act of a radically contingent decision. Starting with the instruction ”Draw 
a distinction” (1971: 3), Spencer Brown names this constructive and violating act of separation. 
Luhmann, too, knows of the arbitrariness and violence of every original distinction: ”Every 
beginning violates the world by this or another distinction in order to indicate this (and not 
something else)” (WG: 548). This distinction indicates the violation of the world by an incision 
which systems theory theorises as ‘out-differentiation’ (Ausdifferenzierung) of systems (SA 5: 18). 
This impossible foundation of a self-referential system has to be erased by the system in order to 
work. It is here that Derrida locates a second form of violence, the violence of the law, which is in 
Luhmannian terms the violence of the ‘invisibilization’ or deparadoxization of the system. The 
‘‘causes’ of a self-referential system are retroactively constructed as internal, otherwise it is not a 
self- but a hetero-referential system. Indeed, outside causes, not produced by the system, would then 
have an organising effect on the system and make it an other-organised system.44 Instead of this 
”black hole” of the system’s ungraspable beginning (Hombach, 1990), the self-referential system 
now functions as a metaphor for the impossibility of the origin. 
Yet, Derrida’s distinction between different types of violence is not simply a linear movement from 
the ‘originary violence’ to the ‘violence of the law’ which, in turn, may be violated by phenomenal 
violence such as war. The arche-violence itself persists and remains ‘present’ as the impossibility of 
the law ever erasing the arche-violence. Thus, the system repeats the originary violence with its 
temporalized, autopoietic organisation. The delay of time which characterizes the impossible 
foundation of the system is repeated in the impossible unity of the constative and performative 
dimension of any systemic operation. Systems theory tries to grasp this as the excluded third: the 
impossibility of an observation to observe itself points negatively to the excluded. The inviolate 
world remains ”what becomes unobservable by an installation of possibilities of observation (no 
matter which form)” (SA 5: 18). It is precisely in what it does not see, that every code becomes the 
metaphor of a non-violated world or an ”unmarked state” (Spencer Brown). The argument about the 
violating institution of an origin does not seek to correct this beginning through total inclusion. 
Such a moral critique would only refer back to its own taboo, to its own forgotten institution, 
resulting in an infinite regress. It is more productive to stress the constitutive necessity of a 
displaced origin for the functioning of a self-referential system.45 Instead of complaining about the 
                                                 
41 Derrida (1991: 28) calls this the ”violent structure of the instituting act” which is itself foundationless. 
42 This does not entail that there is no violence in the normal working of the political system. Luhmann’s (SS: 337ff) 
notion of ”symbiotic mechanisms” stresses that violence is one mechanism that symbolizes the consideration of the 
body within the political system. 
43 cf. Beardsworth (1996: 20ff.) for a detailed reading of the tertiary structure of Derrida’s concept of violence 
(especially referring to WD: 164-65). 
44 The origin itself necessarily escapes: ”However it [the system, us] really originated, what in truth produced it, its 
factual origins will be deleted and effaced as soon as it exists as a self-organised system.”(Hombach, 1990: 128) 
Yet, this description is still misleading since it assumes that there has been a real founding event which is deleted; 
thus one maintains still the assumption of an event which generates a system. 
45 As with the Lacanian Real, the ‘unmarked state’ can only show itself as a failure. ”The Real is therefore 
simultaneously both the hard, impenetrable kernel resisting symbolization and a pure chimerical entity which has in 
itself no ontological consistency” (Zizek, 1989: 169). One can merely show the effects of the Real distorting the 
homogeneity of the symbolic discourse. Here, I have to leave open the difficult question of whether the Real is 
violence of inscriptions, we should focus on the failure of the discursive organization of meaning. 
Hence, to account for arche-violence in systems theory means describing the disturbance of a 
system  e.g., situations of undecidability  as iterations of that violence. 
My discussion of the concept of the system/environment-distinction (Ch. I), and notably of the 
relation between ‘unmarked space’ and ‘unmarked state’ which reformulates the world (Ch. II) as 
well as of the rhetoricity of language (Ch. IV) have focused on Luhmann’s conceptualization of this 
quasi-transcendental realm. These readings underline the argument that Luhmann, on the one hand, 
opens systems theory to this ‘arche-violence’, yet, at the same time, precludes openness by 
compartementalizing and domesticating it. Several strategies became evident: ‘ontologizing’ the 
unmarked space as a ‘common ground’, presupposing a possibilistic notion of the ‘unmarked state’, 
or excising the materiality of communication. Above all, the world is hidden in the blind spot of any 
distinction, yet leaves intact the structure of the distinction. What systems theory fails to show is 
how the blind spot affects the working-order of the system, other than by enabling an endless 
autopoietic deferral. Systems theory’s ‘seriousness’ forces it to integrate the blind spot as 
productive force in its circular economy of meaning, thus omitting an excess which would  maintain 
the system’s autopoiesis, as well as threatening the purity of self-re-production. 
Given the dependence of every system on the paradox inherent in its foundational distinction 
revealed in the code, I suggest a widening of the relationship between politics and the political 
beyond Zizek. If every system owes its existence to a paradoxical, a radical contingent decision and 
institution of its distinction diréctrice, then every system always already presupposes a past which 
has never happened, and yet still haunts the system. The ‘black hole’ suggests that all systems 
function as a metaphor of the political since they are founded upon an insurpassable undecidability. 
The political system may only serve as privileged metaphor, because the production of ‘collective 
binding decisions’ (Luhmann) has become the most conspicuous simulacrum of the political. 
In contrast to Luhmann, the politics/political distinction enables us to construct the contingency of 
every functional system as a matter of the political by problematising the code. This, however, 
makes it necessary to account for the dislocations of a system in challenging the horizontal model of 
meaning. In contrast to Zizek, I argue that every system (not just the political system) figures as a 
representation of the ‘original violence’ inherent in the inscription of the code. This is never simply 
a meaningless representation, but simultaneously the realm of undecidability and negativity opened 
by the paradox of the code (the self-referential encounter of the code with itself). If this assumption 
is ‘true’, we should be able to observe the political at those instances in the history of a system 
when it has to confront the undecidable situations of its paradox. This moment of re-activation46 
emerges whenever the paradox of the code reveals its contingency. 
 
6. Contingencies 
 
Before continuing to inscribe the political, it is necessary to consider what the break with a 
horizontal or  ‘potentialised’ notion of the political implies for the concept of contingency which is 
central to both Laclau and Luhmann. For Laclau, the failure of the structure to avoid undecidability 
is due to a dislocation which demands a decision. For Luhmann, contingency means that anything 
could be different. Yet, a crucial difference is the status of the situation of undecidability and the 
contingency of the decision. While Laclau’s Derridean concept of undecidability goes beyond a 
                                                                                                                                                                  
compatible with deconstruction, but focus only on the problem that the ‘grounding’ impossibility cannot be retained 
in the blind spot, but shows itself in malfunctionings of the system. 
46 Laclau (NRT: 34f.) draws the concept of re-activation from Husserl. This concept stresses the instance when the 
contingency of every social objectivity is shown. 
particular horizon, the undecidabilities within a certain system do not explode its horizon. Let me 
focus on this problem. 
Luhmann conceives contingency within his theory of meaning as an actualization which is not 
necessary and not impossible.47 This Aristotelian concept, as Luhmann (1992a: 104) calls it, is 
paradoxical insofar as it is one concept resulting from the negation of two concepts. Luhmann re-
phrases contingency in the language of second-order-observation: since everything which is 
observed depends on the distinction according to which it is observed, and which it observes, there 
is no ultimate ground for any observation: ”Everything becomes contingent if that which is 
observed becomes dependent on who is being observed” (Luhmann, 1992a: 100). Of course, the 
‘who’ does not refer to an observing subject, but is formally defined as an observation which is 
observed by another observation. This is not only a re-formulation of a subjectivist position, since 
an observation observes another observation. It, thus becomes possible to see the contingency of the 
observed observation. Only in observing something as an observation, does it become obvious that 
other observations were also possible. It is one of the primary aims of Luhmann’s functional 
method to show that operations are selections, thus dependent on the horizon from which one 
possibility was chosen (SS: 52ff.). The notion of contingency relies on a field of selection or a 
horizon which provides a range of possibilities. This horizon does not prescribe the selections 
which have to be made; there is no necessary selection. However, the horizon is itself based on a 
movement of metaphorization in which everything becomes an equivalent as a solution to the 
fundamental problem of how to reduce complexity. The equivalential character of the horizon 
makes different solutions comparable, thus open to a functional analysis (SS: 55). Luhmann’s 
notion of contingency is therefore always a contingency of the possible, always embedded in a 
structure of expectation. The impossible lurks only as a supposedly superficial confusion of signs.48 
The Luhmannian notion of contingency has to be distinguished from the poststructuralist emphasis 
on contingency. The former is based upon selection  and thus like structuralist and linguistic 
arguments  oriented to the functionality of a particular selection (Wellbery, 1992: 161).49 In 
contrast, a poststructuralist concept of contingency refers to an event which is a) unexpected and 
non-deducible from an existing system and b) a suspension of the law, opening to the singularity of 
the event. Contingency is constitutive for the discourse within which it occurs and is always 
exposed to finitude. Eventually, such a notion of contingency questions the hegemony of meaning 
which systems theory relies on:  
 
For contingency does mark a non-meaning which is at work with every constitution of meaning 
without ever being transferred to it[...]. This contingency is the place of an encounter with the Other as 
that which appears external to any horizon of meaning, as that which strikes me in the singularity of 
my existence [...] a contingency as the penetration of non-meaning. (Wellbery, 1992: 166f.; my 
emphasis)  
 
In contrast to Luhmann’s definition of contingency as the negation of the impossible and of the 
necessary, contingency is here intrinsically linked to the impossible which requires an account of 
non-meaning. This contingency deconstructs the concept of horizon and acknowledges the finitude 
of any meaningful ‘actualization’. It was demonstrated in the first part of the thesis that Luhmann 
attempts to exclude from systems theory those moments when contingency exceeds the conceptual 
framework established by structuralism. Luhmann’s contingency resembles a ”contingency with its 
                                                 
47 For example: ”Contingent is everything which is neither necessary nor impossible” (Luhmann, 1992a: 96) 
48 cf.  Ch. II and Ch. IV.2. 
49 Unfortunately, Wellbery chooses to name the poststructuralist version of contingency ”the aleatory”, which could be 
misunderstood as suggesting that there is not a constitutive link between necessity and the aleatory.  
sting plucked out” since it is blind to ”the violent emergence of an unheard-of entity that defies the 
limits of the established field of what one holds for ‘possible’” (Zizek: 1991, 196).50 
Laclau’s political theory is based upon such a poststructuralist approach to contingency. In contrast 
to Luhmann, contingency introduces the necessity of impossibility within the actualization of a 
possibility. Contingency, then, is the ”blocking and simultaneous affirmation of an identity” (NRT: 
21), it is simultaneously an enabling and threatening process, leaving behind any possibility of 
neatly separating that which belongs to an identity and that which is an accidental supplement. 
Thus, contingency is not simply the assumption that everything could be different, although it 
includes this assumption. Rather, contingency is the very undecidability of identity as such, of the 
system as such. Contingency is always marked by an event which is not calculable within an 
existing system, something which cannot be captured by a structure of expectation. It is, therefore, 
something which interrupts the functioning of the system, which points at the finitude of the system 
from within the system. Contingency, in this sense, is not reduced to the demonstration of 
functional equivalences, but more radically, is that which disrupts its functional set-up. Luhmann’s 
notion of contingency does imply a certain negativity, since functional equivalence has to 
presuppose something contingent. Yet, while for Laclau it is a movement of metaphorisation which 
reveals the finitude of the system, Luhmann ‘invisibilizes’ this negativity by filling it with 
invariants such as an unchangeable function, or code of the system. Moreover, contingency remains 
heavily restricted as long as one locates contingency prior to its signifying medium bracketing the 
materiality of the medium.51 
Let us look again at the argument of this chapter. The in(ter)vention of the political in systems 
theory understands it as decisions taken in an undecidable terrain unrestricted to the political 
system. This leads to the question of whether there is a Luhmannian theoretical equivalent of the 
‘undecidable terrain’. On the most general level, he conceives undecidability in terms of a paradox 
as ‘ground’ of any system. A system is never able to overcome its paradox and reach a harmonious 
state of equilibrium. Luhmann introduces the distinction of code/program to explain how a system 
handles its paradox. Different programs attempt to defer and displace the paradox, i.e., they 
deparadoxize the system. However, the rigid separation of codes and programs and the dismissal of 
a full feedback of self-descriptions, grants to each system too much continuity. The code is 
untouched by the transformation of programs. A shift of perspective allows me to conceive the 
political beyond the political system. If the political can be grasped in the relation of undecidability 
and decision, and if the paradox of the code in systems theory creates undecidable situations, then 
we should focus on this theoretical articulation. This is precisely the terrain covered by Luhmann’s 
concept of contradiction and conflict. It returns us to the level of general systems theory, because 
contradictions occur in every system. Thus the political becomes conceivable in systems theory, 
without being exclusively bound to the politics of the political system. 
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